David Scott Krueger

Danqi Chen

Samuel Albanie

Jakob Nicolaus Foerster

Florian Tramèr

He He

Atoosa Kasirzadeh

Yejin Choi

This work identifies 18 foundational challenges in assuring the alignment and safety of large language models (LLMs). These challenges are o… (voir plus)rganized into three different categories: scientific understanding of LLMs, development and deployment methods, and sociotechnical challenges. Based on the identified challenges, we pose

2024-04-15

ArXiv (prépublication)

Foundational Challenges in Assuring Alignment and Safety of Large Language Models

Usman Anwar

Abulhair Saparov

Javier Rando

Daniel Paleka

Miles Turpin

Peter Hase

Ekdeep Singh Lubana

Erik Jenner

Stephen Casper

Oliver Sourbut

Benjamin L. Edelman

Zhaowei Zhang

Mario Günther

Anton Korinek

Jose Hernandez-Orallo

Lewis Hammond

Eric J Bigelow

Alexander Pan

Lauro Langosco

Tomasz Korbak … (voir 18 de plus)

Heidi Chenyu Zhang

Ruiqi Zhong

Sean O hEigeartaigh

Gabriel Recchia

Giulio Corsi

Alan Chan

Markus Anderljung

Lilian Edwards

Danqi Chen

Samuel Albanie

Jakob Nicolaus Foerster

Florian Tramèr

He He

Atoosa Kasirzadeh

Yejin Choi

This work identifies 18 foundational challenges in assuring the alignment and safety of large language models (LLMs). These challenges are o… (voir plus)rganized into three different categories: scientific understanding of LLMs, development and deployment methods, and sociotechnical challenges. Based on the identified challenges, we pose

2024-04-15

ArXiv (prépublication)

Foundational Challenges in Assuring Alignment and Safety of Large Language Models

Usman Anwar

Abulhair Saparov

Javier Rando

Daniel Paleka

Miles Turpin

Peter Hase

Ekdeep Singh Lubana

Erik Jenner

Stephen Casper

Oliver Sourbut

Benjamin L. Edelman

Zhaowei Zhang

Mario Günther

Anton Korinek

Jose Hernandez-Orallo

Lewis Hammond

Eric J Bigelow

Alexander Pan

Lauro Langosco

Tomasz Korbak … (voir 18 de plus)

Heidi Zhang

Ruiqi Zhong

Sean 'o H'eigeartaigh

Gabriel Recchia

Giulio Corsi

Alan Chan

Markus Anderljung

Lilian Edwards

Danqi Chen

Samuel Albanie

Jakob Nicolaus Foerster

Florian Tramèr

He He

Atoosa Kasirzadeh

Yejin Choi

This work identifies 18 foundational challenges in assuring the alignment and safety of large language models (LLMs). These challenges are o… (voir plus)rganized into three different categories: scientific understanding of LLMs, development and deployment methods, and sociotechnical challenges. Based on the identified challenges, we pose

2024-04-15

ArXiv (prépublication)

Foundational Challenges in Assuring Alignment and Safety of Large Language Models

Usman Anwar

Abulhair Saparov

Javier Rando

Daniel Paleka

Miles Turpin

Peter Hase

Ekdeep Singh Lubana

Erik Jenner

Stephen Casper

Oliver Sourbut

Benjamin L. Edelman

Zhaowei Zhang

Mario Günther

Anton Korinek

Jose Hernandez-Orallo

Lewis Hammond

Eric J Bigelow

Alexander Pan

Lauro Langosco

Tomasz Korbak … (voir 18 de plus)

Heidi Chenyu Zhang

Ruiqi Zhong

Sean O hEigeartaigh

Gabriel Recchia

Giulio Corsi

Alan Chan

Markus Anderljung

Lilian Edwards

Danqi Chen

Samuel Albanie

Jakob Nicolaus Foerster

Florian Tramèr

He He

Atoosa Kasirzadeh

Yejin Choi

This work identifies 18 foundational challenges in assuring the alignment and safety of large language models (LLMs). These challenges are o… (voir plus)rganized into three different categories: scientific understanding of LLMs, development and deployment methods, and sociotechnical challenges. Based on the identified challenges, we pose

2024-04-15

ArXiv (prépublication)

Foundational Challenges in Assuring Alignment and Safety of Large Language Models

Usman Anwar

Abulhair Saparov

Javier Rando

Daniel Paleka

Miles Turpin

Peter Hase

Ekdeep Singh Lubana

Erik Jenner

Stephen Casper

Oliver Sourbut

Benjamin L. Edelman

Zhaowei Zhang

Mario Günther

Anton Korinek

Jose Hernandez-Orallo

Lewis Hammond

Eric J Bigelow

Alexander Pan

Lauro Langosco

Tomasz Korbak … (voir 18 de plus)

Heidi Chenyu Zhang

Ruiqi Zhong

Sean O hEigeartaigh

Gabriel Recchia

Giulio Corsi

Alan Chan

Markus Anderljung

Lilian Edwards

Danqi Chen

Samuel Albanie

Jakob Nicolaus Foerster

Florian Tramèr

He He

Atoosa Kasirzadeh

Yejin Choi

This work identifies 18 foundational challenges in assuring the alignment and safety of large language models (LLMs). These challenges are o… (voir plus)rganized into three different categories: scientific understanding of LLMs, development and deployment methods, and sociotechnical challenges. Based on the identified challenges, we pose

2024-04-15

ArXiv (prépublication)

Affirmative safety: An approach to risk management for high-risk AI

Akash Wasil

Joshua Clymer

Emily Dardaman

Simeon Campos

Evan Murphy

Prominent AI experts have suggested that companies developing high-risk AI systems should be required to show that such systems are safe bef… (voir plus)ore they can be developed or deployed. The goal of this paper is to expand on this idea and explore its implications for risk management. We argue that entities developing or deploying high-risk AI systems should be required to present evidence of affirmative safety: a proactive case that their activities keep risks below acceptable thresholds. We begin the paper by highlighting global security risks from AI that have been acknowledged by AI experts and world governments. Next, we briefly describe principles of risk management from other high-risk fields (e.g., nuclear safety). Then, we propose a risk management approach for advanced AI in which model developers must provide evidence that their activities keep certain risks below regulator-set thresholds. As a first step toward understanding what affirmative safety cases should include, we illustrate how certain kinds of technical evidence and operational evidence can support an affirmative safety case. In the technical section, we discuss behavioral evidence (evidence about model outputs), cognitive evidence (evidence about model internals), and developmental evidence (evidence about the training process). In the operational section, we offer examples of organizational practices that could contribute to affirmative safety cases: information security practices, safety culture, and emergency response capacity. Finally, we briefly compare our approach to the NIST AI Risk Management Framework. Overall, we hope our work contributes to ongoing discussions about national and global security risks posed by AI and regulatory approaches to address these risks.

2024-04-14

ArXiv (prépublication)

Affirmative safety: An approach to risk management for high-risk AI

Akash Wasil

Joshua Clymer

Emily Dardaman

Simeon Campos

Evan Murphy

Prominent AI experts have suggested that companies developing high-risk AI systems should be required to show that such systems are safe bef… (voir plus)ore they can be developed or deployed. The goal of this paper is to expand on this idea and explore its implications for risk management. We argue that entities developing or deploying high-risk AI systems should be required to present evidence of affirmative safety: a proactive case that their activities keep risks below acceptable thresholds. We begin the paper by highlighting global security risks from AI that have been acknowledged by AI experts and world governments. Next, we briefly describe principles of risk management from other high-risk fields (e.g., nuclear safety). Then, we propose a risk management approach for advanced AI in which model developers must provide evidence that their activities keep certain risks below regulator-set thresholds. As a first step toward understanding what affirmative safety cases should include, we illustrate how certain kinds of technical evidence and operational evidence can support an affirmative safety case. In the technical section, we discuss behavioral evidence (evidence about model outputs), cognitive evidence (evidence about model internals), and developmental evidence (evidence about the training process). In the operational section, we offer examples of organizational practices that could contribute to affirmative safety cases: information security practices, safety culture, and emergency response capacity. Finally, we briefly compare our approach to the NIST AI Risk Management Framework. Overall, we hope our work contributes to ongoing discussions about national and global security risks posed by AI and regulatory approaches to address these risks.

2024-04-14

ArXiv (prépublication)

Safety Cases: How to Justify the Safety of Advanced AI Systems

Joshua Clymer

Nick Gabrieli

Thomas Larsen

As AI systems become more advanced, companies and regulators will make difficult decisions about whether it is safe to train and deploy them… (voir plus). To prepare for these decisions, we investigate how developers could make a 'safety case,' which is a structured rationale that AI systems are unlikely to cause a catastrophe. We propose a framework for organizing a safety case and discuss four categories of arguments to justify safety: total inability to cause a catastrophe, sufficiently strong control measures, trustworthiness despite capability to cause harm, and -- if AI systems become much more powerful -- deference to credible AI advisors. We evaluate concrete examples of arguments in each category and outline how arguments could be combined to justify that AI systems are safe to deploy.

2024-03-15

ArXiv (prépublication)

Safety Cases: How to Justify the Safety of Advanced AI Systems

Joshua Clymer

Nick Gabrieli

Thomas Larsen

As AI systems become more advanced, companies and regulators will make difficult decisions about whether it is safe to train and deploy them… (voir plus). To prepare for these decisions, we investigate how developers could make a 'safety case,' which is a structured rationale that AI systems are unlikely to cause a catastrophe. We propose a framework for organizing a safety case and discuss four categories of arguments to justify safety: total inability to cause a catastrophe, sufficiently strong control measures, trustworthiness despite capability to cause harm, and -- if AI systems become much more powerful -- deference to credible AI advisors. We evaluate concrete examples of arguments in each category and outline how arguments could be combined to justify that AI systems are safe to deploy.

2024-03-15

ArXiv (prépublication)

A Generative Model of Symmetry Transformations

James U. Allingham

Bruno Mlodozeniec

Shreyas Padhy

Javier Antor'an

Richard E. Turner

Eric T. Nalisnick

Jos'e Miguel Hern'andez-Lobato

Correctly capturing the symmetry transformations of data can lead to efficient models with strong generalization capabilities, though method… (voir plus)s incorporating symmetries often require prior knowledge. While recent advancements have been made in learning those symmetries directly from the dataset, most of this work has focused on the discriminative setting. In this paper, we construct a generative model that explicitly aims to capture symmetries in the data, resulting in a model that learns which symmetries are present in an interpretable way. We provide a simple algorithm for efficiently learning our generative model and demonstrate its ability to capture symmetries under affine and color transformations. Combining our symmetry model with existing generative models results in higher marginal test-log-likelihoods and robustness to data sparsification.

2024-03-04

ArXiv (prépublication)

A Generative Model of Symmetry Transformations

James Urquhart Allingham

Bruno Mlodozeniec

Shreyas Padhy

Javier Antoran

Richard E. Turner

Eric Nalisnick

José Miguel Hernández-Lobato

Correctly capturing the symmetry transformations of data can lead to efficient models with strong generalization capabilities, though method… (voir plus)s incorporating symmetries often require prior knowledge. While recent advancements have been made in learning those symmetries directly from the dataset, most of this work has focused on the discriminative setting. In this paper, we take inspiration from group theoretic ideas to construct a generative model that explicitly aims to capture the data's approximate symmetries. This results in a model that, given a prespecified but broad set of possible symmetries, learns to what extent, if at all, those symmetries are actually present. Our model can be seen as a generative process for data augmentation. We provide a simple algorithm for learning our generative model and empirically demonstrate its ability to capture symmetries under affine and color transformations, in an interpretable way. Combining our symmetry model with standard generative models results in higher marginal test-log-likelihoods and improved data efficiency.

2024-03-04

ArXiv (prépublication)

A Generative Model of Symmetry Transformations

James Urquhart Allingham

Bruno Mlodozeniec

Shreyas Padhy

Javier Antoran

Richard E. Turner

Eric Nalisnick

José Miguel Hernández-Lobato

Correctly capturing the symmetry transformations of data can lead to efficient models with strong generalization capabilities, though method… (voir plus)s incorporating symmetries often require prior knowledge. While recent advancements have been made in learning those symmetries directly from the dataset, most of this work has focused on the discriminative setting. In this paper, we take inspiration from group theoretic ideas to construct a generative model that explicitly aims to capture the data's approximate symmetries. This results in a model that, given a prespecified but broad set of possible symmetries, learns to what extent, if at all, those symmetries are actually present. Our model can be seen as a generative process for data augmentation. We provide a simple algorithm for learning our generative model and empirically demonstrate its ability to capture symmetries under affine and color transformations, in an interpretable way. Combining our symmetry model with standard generative models results in higher marginal test-log-likelihoods and improved data efficiency.

2024-03-04

ArXiv (prépublication)