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Publications
Position: Probabilistic Modelling is Sufficient for Causal Inference
A growing body of computational studies shows that simple machine learning agents converge to cooperative behaviors in social dilemmas, such… (see more) as collusive price-setting in oligopoly markets, raising questions about what drives this outcome. In this work, we provide theoretical foundations for this phenomenon in the context of self-play multi-agent Q-learners in the iterated prisoner’s dilemma. We characterize broad conditions under which such agents provably learn the cooperative Pavlov (win-stay, lose-shift) policy rather than the Pareto-dominated “always defect” policy. We validate our theoretical results through additional experiments, demonstrating their robustness across a broader class of deep learning algorithms.
