Développez des compétences fondamentales en intelligence artificielle (IA) responsable grâce à des cours autodirigés, animés par des expert·e·s de Mila reconnu·e·s à l’échelle internationale.
Le Fellowship Mila en politiques de l'IA transforme l'expertise approfondie en IA en politiques rigoureuses d'intérêt public. Découvrez la dernière publication Combler la disparité en matière d’expertise : mécanismes de transfert des connaissances pour la réglementation de l’IA par Moritz von Knebel.
Ce programme soutient les startups spécialisées en IA à tout moment de l'année. Bénéficiez de ressources de pointe et d'un accompagnement sur mesure pour accélérer le développement de votre technologie.
Nous utilisons des témoins pour analyser le trafic et l’utilisation de notre site web, afin de personnaliser votre expérience. Vous pouvez désactiver ces technologies à tout moment, mais cela peut restreindre certaines fonctionnalités du site. Consultez notre Politique de protection de la vie privée pour en savoir plus.
Paramètre des cookies
Vous pouvez activer et désactiver les types de cookies que vous souhaitez accepter. Cependant certains choix que vous ferez pourraient affecter les services proposés sur nos sites (ex : suggestions, annonces personnalisées, etc.).
Cookies essentiels
Ces cookies sont nécessaires au fonctionnement du site et ne peuvent être désactivés. (Toujours actif)
Cookies analyse
Acceptez-vous l'utilisation de cookies pour mesurer l'audience de nos sites ?
Lecteur Multimédia
Acceptez-vous l'utilisation de cookies pour afficher et vous permettre de regarder les contenus vidéo hébergés par nos partenaires (YouTube, etc.) ?
This position paper argues that AI agents with chain-of-thought reasoning capabilities are predisposed to exhibit collusive behavior and sho… (voir plus)uld be required to obtain behavioral certification before making decisions that affect economic markets. This is because integrating these agents into society could collapse the legal evidentiary distinction between competition and collusion among independent firms without eroding the economic harm distinction. Experiments with DeepSeek-R1 agents in the Bertrand oligopoly pricing domain reveal a tendency towards tacit collusion that persists even when humans prompt the agents not to collude. We further show that the chain-of- thought of these agents can be steered toward either extremely collusive or highly competitive behavior in a way that is not semantically detectable by another LLM analyzing the reasoning traces. As a result, deploying reasoning agents for market decisions leads to collusive economic outcomes without any evidence of conspiracy or intent. Thus, certification based on observed behavior in representative situations is necessary to prevent collusion. We provide preliminary evidence that such agents can be steered in a generalizable way toward efficient competitive equilibria. However, developing a comprehensive behavioral certification will be required before these models can be deployed in real-world markets while ensuring their stability and efficiency.
2025-12-31
International Conference on Machine Learning (Accept (regular))
Several studies have probed perceptual performance at different times after a self-paced motor action and found frequency-specific modulatio… (voir plus)ns of perceptual performance phase-locked to the action. Such action-related modulation has been reported for various frequencies and modulation strengths. In an attempt to establish a basic effect at the population level, we had a relatively large number of participants (n=50) perform a self-paced button press followed by a detection task at threshold, and we applied both fixed- and random-effects tests. The combined data of all trials and participants surprisingly did not show any significant action-related modulation. However, based on previous studies, we explored the possibility that such modulation depends on the participant’s internal state. Indeed, when we split trials based on performance in neighboring trials, then trials in periods of low performance showed an action-related modulation at ≈17 Hz. When we split trials based on the performance in the preceding trial, we found that trials following a “miss” showed an action-related modulation at ≈17 Hz. Finally, when we split participants based on their false-alarm rate, we found that participants with no false alarms showed an action-related modulation at ≈17 Hz. All these effects were significant in random-effects tests, supporting an inference on the population. Together, these findings indicate that action-related modulations are not always detectable. However, the results suggest that specific internal states such as lower attentional engagement and/or higher decision criterion are characterized by a modulation in the beta-frequency range.