Eric Elmoznino

Jonathan C. P. Birch

Axel Constant

George Deane

S. Fleming

C. Frith

Xuanxiu Ji

Ryota Kanai

C. Klein

Grace W. Lindsay

Matthias Michel

Liad Mudrik

Megan A. K. Peters

Eric Schwitzgebel

Jonathan Simon

Rufin Vanrullen

Whether current or near-term AI systems could be conscious is a topic of scientific interest and increasing public concern. This report argu… (voir plus)es for, and exemplifies, a rigorous and empirically grounded approach to AI consciousness: assessing existing AI systems in detail, in light of our best-supported neuroscientific theories of consciousness. We survey several prominent scientific theories of consciousness, including recurrent processing theory, global workspace theory, higher-order theories, predictive processing, and attention schema theory. From these theories we derive"indicator properties"of consciousness, elucidated in computational terms that allow us to assess AI systems for these properties. We use these indicator properties to assess several recent AI systems, and we discuss how future systems might implement them. Our analysis suggests that no current AI systems are conscious, but also suggests that there are no obvious technical barriers to building AI systems which satisfy these indicators.

2023-08-17

ArXiv (prépublication)

Consciousness in Artificial Intelligence: Insights from the Science of Consciousness

Patrick Mark Butlin

R. Long

Jonathan C. P. Birch

Axel Constant

George Deane

S. Fleming

C. Frith

Xuanxiu Ji

Ryota Kanai

C. Klein

Grace W. Lindsay

Matthias Michel

Liad Mudrik

Megan A. K. Peters

Eric Schwitzgebel

Jonathan Simon

Rufin Vanrullen

Whether current or near-term AI systems could be conscious is a topic of scientific interest and increasing public concern. This report argu… (voir plus)es for, and exemplifies, a rigorous and empirically grounded approach to AI consciousness: assessing existing AI systems in detail, in light of our best-supported neuroscientific theories of consciousness. We survey several prominent scientific theories of consciousness, including recurrent processing theory, global workspace theory, higher-order theories, predictive processing, and attention schema theory. From these theories we derive"indicator properties"of consciousness, elucidated in computational terms that allow us to assess AI systems for these properties. We use these indicator properties to assess several recent AI systems, and we discuss how future systems might implement them. Our analysis suggests that no current AI systems are conscious, but also suggests that there are no obvious technical barriers to building AI systems which satisfy these indicators.

2023-08-17

ArXiv (prépublication)

Sources of richness and ineffability for phenomenally conscious states

Xu Ji

George Deane

Axel Constant

Guillaume Dumas

Guillaume Lajoie

Jonathan Simon

Abstract Conscious states—state that there is something it is like to be in—seem both rich or full of detail and ineffable or hard to fu… (voir plus)lly describe or recall. The problem of ineffability, in particular, is a longstanding issue in philosophy that partly motivates the explanatory gap: the belief that consciousness cannot be reduced to underlying physical processes. Here, we provide an information theoretic dynamical systems perspective on the richness and ineffability of consciousness. In our framework, the richness of conscious experience corresponds to the amount of information in a conscious state and ineffability corresponds to the amount of information lost at different stages of processing. We describe how attractor dynamics in working memory would induce impoverished recollections of our original experiences, how the discrete symbolic nature of language is insufficient for describing the rich and high-dimensional structure of experiences, and how similarity in the cognitive function of two individuals relates to improved communicability of their experiences to each other. While our model may not settle all questions relating to the explanatory gap, it makes progress toward a fully physicalist explanation of the richness and ineffability of conscious experience—two important aspects that seem to be part of what makes qualitative character so puzzling.

2023-02-13

ArXiv (prépublication)

Sources of richness and ineffability for phenomenally conscious states

Xu Ji

George Deane

Axel Constant

Guillaume Dumas

Guillaume Lajoie

Jonathan Simon

Abstract Conscious states—state that there is something it is like to be in—seem both rich or full of detail and ineffable or hard to fu… (voir plus)lly describe or recall. The problem of ineffability, in particular, is a longstanding issue in philosophy that partly motivates the explanatory gap: the belief that consciousness cannot be reduced to underlying physical processes. Here, we provide an information theoretic dynamical systems perspective on the richness and ineffability of consciousness. In our framework, the richness of conscious experience corresponds to the amount of information in a conscious state and ineffability corresponds to the amount of information lost at different stages of processing. We describe how attractor dynamics in working memory would induce impoverished recollections of our original experiences, how the discrete symbolic nature of language is insufficient for describing the rich and high-dimensional structure of experiences, and how similarity in the cognitive function of two individuals relates to improved communicability of their experiences to each other. While our model may not settle all questions relating to the explanatory gap, it makes progress toward a fully physicalist explanation of the richness and ineffability of conscious experience—two important aspects that seem to be part of what makes qualitative character so puzzling.

2023-02-13

ArXiv (prépublication)