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Razvan Ciuca

Alumni

Publications

Towards Sustainable Investment Policies Informed by Opponent Shaping
Juan Agustin Duque
Razvan Ciuca
Ayoub Echchahed
Hugo Larochelle
Aaron Courville
Addressing climate change requires global coordination, yet rational economic actors often prioritize immediate gains over collective welfar… (voir plus)e, resulting in social dilemmas. InvestESG is a recently proposed multi-agent simulation that captures the dynamic interplay between investors and companies under climate risk. We provide a formal characterization of the conditions under which InvestESG exhibits an intertemporal social dilemma, deriving theoretical thresholds at which individual incentives diverge from collective welfare. Building on this, we apply Advantage Alignment, a scalable opponent shaping algorithm shown to be effective in general-sum games, to influence agent learning in InvestESG. We offer theoretical insights into why Advantage Alignment systematically favors socially beneficial equilibria by biasing learning dynamics toward cooperative outcomes. Our results demonstrate that strategically shaping the learning processes of economic agents can result in better outcomes that could inform policy mechanisms to better align market incentives with long-term sustainability goals.
2025-06-22
rl-conference.cc/RLC/2025/Workshop/CoCoMARL (poster)
openreview.net
openreview.net
Advantage Alignment Algorithms
Juan Duque
Milad Aghajohari
Tim Cooijmans
Razvan Ciuca
Tianyu Zhang
Gauthier Gidel
Aaron Courville
The growing presence of artificially intelligent agents in everyday decision-making, from LLM assistants to autonomous vehicles, hints at a … (voir plus)future in which conflicts may arise from each agent optimizing individual interests. In general-sum games these conflicts are apparent, where naive Reinforcement Learning agents get stuck in Pareto-suboptimal Nash equilibria. Consequently, opponent shaping has been introduced as a method with success at finding socially beneficial equilibria in social dilemmas. In this work, we introduce Advantage Alignment, a family of algorithms derived from first principles that perform opponent shaping efficiently and intuitively. This is achieved by aligning the advantages of conflicting agents in a given game by increasing the probability of mutually-benefiting actions. We prove that existing opponent shaping methods, including LOLA and LOQA, implicitly perform Advantage Alignment. Compared to these works, Advantage Alignment mathematically simplifies the formulation of opponent shaping and seamlessly works for continuous action domains. We also demonstrate the effectiveness of our algorithm in a wide range of social dilemmas, achieving state of the art results in each case, including a social dilemma version of the Negotiation Game.
2025-01-21
International Conference on Learning Representations (présentation orale)
doi.org
openreview.net