The upcoming meeting, taking place on November 10 at Mila, will explore how we can collectively develop, govern, and deploy high-performing, reliable, and secure agentic systems by connecting academic researchers, industry experts, and practitioners.
Join us on the Venture Scientist Bootcamp, a full time, 4-month incubator at Mila, built specifically for deep tech founders with elite STEM backgrounds. You have until November 21, 2026 to apply!
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As agentic AI becomes more widespread, agents with distinct and possibly conflicting goals will interact in complex ways. These multi-agent … (see more)interactions pose a fundamental challenge, particularly in social dilemmas, where agents' individual incentives can undermine collective welfare. While reinforcement learning (RL) has been effective for aligning large language models (LLMs) in the single-agent regime, prior small-network results suggest that standard RL in multi-agent settings often converges to defecting, self-interested policies. We show the same effect in LLMs: despite cooperative priors, RL-trained LLM agents develop opportunistic behaviour that can exploit even advanced models. To address this tendency of RL to converge to poor equilibria, we adapt a recent opponent-learning awareness algorithm, Advantage Alignment, to fine-tune LLMs toward multi-agent cooperation and robustness against exploitation. We then introduce a group-relative baseline that simplifies advantage computation in iterated games, enabling multi-agent training at LLM scale. We also contribute a novel social dilemma environment, Trust-and-Split, which requires natural language communication to achieve high collective welfare. Across a wide range of social dilemmas, policies learned with Advantage Alignment achieve higher collective payoffs while remaining robust against exploitation by greedy agents.
2026-11-03
Transactions on Machine Learning Research (accepted)
Mean Field Games (MFGs) provide a principled framework for modeling interactions in large populations models: at scale, population dynamics … (see more)become deterministic, with uncertainty entering only through aggregate shocks, or *common noise*. However, algorithmic progress has been limited since model-free methods are too high variance and exact methods scale poorly. Recent Hybrid Structural Methods (HSMs) use Monte Carlo rollouts for the common noise in combination with exact estimation of the expected return, conditioned on those samples. However, HSMs have not been scaled to Partially Observable settings. We propose *Recurrent Structural Policy Gradient* (RSPG), the first history-aware HSM. We also introduce MFAX, our JAX-based framework for MFGs. By leveraging known transition dynamics, RSPG achieves state-of-the-art performance as well as an order-of-magnitude faster convergence and solves, for the first time, a macroeconomics MFG with heterogeneous agents, common noise and history-aware policies. MFAX is publicly available at: .
2025-12-31
International Conference on Machine Learning (Accept (spotlight))
The growing presence of artificially intelligent agents in everyday decision-making, from LLM assistants to autonomous vehicles, hints at a … (see more)future in which conflicts may arise from each agent optimizing individual interests. In general-sum games these conflicts are apparent, where naive Reinforcement Learning agents get stuck in Pareto-suboptimal Nash equilibria. Consequently, opponent shaping has been introduced as a method with success at finding socially beneficial equilibria in social dilemmas. In this work, we introduce Advantage Alignment, a family of algorithms derived from first principles that perform opponent shaping efficiently and intuitively. This is achieved by aligning the advantages of conflicting agents in a given game by increasing the probability of mutually-benefiting actions. We prove that existing opponent shaping methods, including LOLA and LOQA, implicitly perform Advantage Alignment. Compared to these works, Advantage Alignment mathematically simplifies the formulation of opponent shaping and seamlessly works for continuous action domains. We also demonstrate the effectiveness of our algorithm in a wide range of social dilemmas, achieving state of the art results in each case, including a social dilemma version of the Negotiation Game.
2025-01-21
International Conference on Learning Representations (oral)