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Damiano Fornasiere
Alumni
Publications
Efficient Safety Alignment of Language Models via Latent Personality Traits
Current safety methods for large language models are known to be vulnerable to adversarial attacks, motivating research into robust alternat… (see more)ives. Latent Adversarial Training (LAT) is among the most effective defenses, but can degrade utility and requires training on large datasets of harmful prompts. We introduce Latent Personality Alignment (LPA), which replaces explicit harm refusal with adversarial training on just 66 harm-agnostic statements drawn from psychometric personality literature. We hypothesize that personality-anchored representations share latent structure with harm avoidance, so adversarially stabilizing them implicitly constrains the subspace exploited by jailbreak attacks. LPA achieves near-zero attack success rates on HarmBench across direct requests and five jailbreak methods, despite never seeing harmful content during training and no loss of performance on standard benchmarks. Moreover, the training process is lightweight; the entire procedure completes in minutes on a single GPU and uses 75x fewer examples than standard LAT. Extensive ablations demonstrate the robustness, efficiency, and generalization of our method.
Large language models generate one token at a time, yet their responses show remarkably consistent length structure: step-by-step solutions … (see more)converge in predictable token counts, retrievals stop after a few sentences, retractions extend responses by measurable amounts. We ask whether the model carries an internal estimate of how much response remains. Training minimal-capacity linear probes on frozen hidden states of three open-weight 7-8B models across seven completion-style datasets, we find three converging pieces of evidence. First, total response length is linearly decodable from the prompt's last hidden state alone, before any output is emitted. Second, probe directions trained on natural-language datasets transfer broadly, including to controlled synthetic completions never seen in training, outperforming a statistical baseline; the converse direction generally fails, and this asymmetry is itself informative. Third, on curated high-loss completions, the probe's per-position estimate shifts upward at the moment the model retracts and restarts a partial solution, a directional behavior no position-only predictor can reproduce (qualitative, not aggregate). We frame this as approximate estimation of remaining generation length, distinct from exact-counting impossibility results for transformers, and interpret it as evidence that LLMs maintain a plan-like internal representation of output length (decodable, not necessarily used causally).
As AI systems become more capable, training procedures that optimize for downstream outcomes risk introducing implicit agency: goal-directed… (see more) behavior that designers never specified. We present a formal safety argument for the Scientist AI (SAI) Predictor, trained to approximate the Bayesian posterior conditioned on a dataset of"epistemically contextualized"natural-language statements. We argue that such a Predictor can honestly predict agents, actions, and their consequences without itself being an agent that selects outputs to achieve goals. This rests on data representation and on the training procedure. Epistemic contextualization of text distinguishes latent factual claims from communication acts, so expressions of goals are treated as evidence to be explained rather than drives the model adopts. With a posterior-seeking training objective, this is intended to drive the Predictor toward calibrated, cautious predictions. Training proceeds so downstream effects of deploying a prediction never serve as a reward signal; any agency the system needs is supplied by explicit scaffolding constrained by guardrails. We prove that, under assumptions on the training dynamics and on the argued sparsity of dangerous Predictors, the probability that training produces a Predictor whose guarded deployment carries residual harm above a specified threshold is small: a dangerous Predictor would have to underestimate harm in a coordinated way across many queries while such coordinated patterns are rare under the initialization distribution and receive no direct training signal. Safety and accuracy are jointly supported in this framework, since the constraints that secure accuracy are the same ones that make coordinated deception costly. These guarantees against misalignment and agency arising from within the Predictor itself do not preclude the use of the Predictor as part of an agentic system.
Symbolic regression is the problem of finding an algebraic expression describing a stochastic dependence of a target variable on a set of in… (see more)puts. Unlike forms of regression that fit parameters assuming a fixed model structure, symbolic regression is a search problem over the space of expressions, represented, for example, as abstract syntax trees using a library of operators. Symbolic regression is typically used in settings with limited, noisy data in the natural sciences. However, searching for a single best-fitting expression fails to capture the epistemic uncertainty about the expression, which motivates a Bayesian perspective that enables uncertainty quantification and specification of natural priors to constrain the search space. In this work, we propose ERRLESS (Entropy-Regularized Reinforcement Learning for Expression Structure Sampling), a scalable approach for sampling from the posterior distribution over expressions given data using maximum-entropy reinforcement learning. ERRLESS learns a neural policy that constructs expressions sequentially by building up their abstract syntax trees. At convergence, the policy samples expressions from the posterior. At test time, expressions can be sampled by rollouts of this policy. We demonstrate that ERRLESS achieves competitive results on the Feynman benchmark while producing short and interpretable expressions. Additionally, we demonstrate that the mean of the posterior predictive approximated by ERRLESS achieves a high coefficient of determination (
2026-05-30
Conference on Uncertainty in Artificial Intelligence (poster)
The leading AI companies are increasingly focused on building generalist AI agents -- systems that can autonomously plan, act, and pursue go… (see more)als across almost all tasks that humans can perform. Despite how useful these systems might be, unchecked AI agency poses significant risks to public safety and security, ranging from misuse by malicious actors to a potentially irreversible loss of human control. We discuss how these risks arise from current AI training methods. Indeed, various scenarios and experiments have demonstrated the possibility of AI agents engaging in deception or pursuing goals that were not specified by human operators and that conflict with human interests, such as self-preservation. Following the precautionary principle, we see a strong need for safer, yet still useful, alternatives to the current agency-driven trajectory. Accordingly, we propose as a core building block for further advances the development of a non-agentic AI system that is trustworthy and safe by design, which we call Scientist AI. This system is designed to explain the world from observations, as opposed to taking actions in it to imitate or please humans. It comprises a world model that generates theories to explain data and a question-answering inference machine. Both components operate with an explicit notion of uncertainty to mitigate the risks of overconfident predictions. In light of these considerations, a Scientist AI could be used to assist human researchers in accelerating scientific progress, including in AI safety. In particular, our system can be employed as a guardrail against AI agents that might be created despite the risks involved. Ultimately, focusing on non-agentic AI may enable the benefits of AI innovation while avoiding the risks associated with the current trajectory. We hope these arguments will motivate researchers, developers, and policymakers to favor this safer path.
Is there a way to design powerful AI systems based on machine learning methods that would satisfy probabilistic safety guarantees? With the … (see more)long-term goal of obtaining a probabilistic guarantee that would apply in every context, we consider estimating a context-dependent bound on the probability of violating a given safety specification. Such a risk evaluation would need to be performed at run-time to provide a guardrail against dangerous actions of an AI. Noting that different plausible hypotheses about the world could produce very different outcomes, and because we do not know which one is right, we derive bounds on the safety violation probability predicted under the true but unknown hypothesis. Such bounds could be used to reject potentially dangerous actions. Our main results involve searching for cautious but plausible hypotheses, obtained by a maximization that involves Bayesian posteriors over hypotheses. We consider two forms of this result, in the iid case and in the non-iid case, and conclude with open problems towards turning such theoretical results into practical AI guardrails.
2025-05-06
Conference on Uncertainty in Artificial Intelligence (poster)
The leading AI companies are increasingly focused on building generalist AI agents -- systems that can autonomously plan, act, and pursue go… (see more)als across almost all tasks that humans can perform. Despite how useful these systems might be, unchecked AI agency poses significant risks to public safety and security, ranging from misuse by malicious actors to a potentially irreversible loss of human control. We discuss how these risks arise from current AI training methods. Indeed, various scenarios and experiments have demonstrated the possibility of AI agents engaging in deception or pursuing goals that were not specified by human operators and that conflict with human interests, such as self-preservation. Following the precautionary principle, we see a strong need for safer, yet still useful, alternatives to the current agency-driven trajectory. Accordingly, we propose as a core building block for further advances the development of a non-agentic AI system that is trustworthy and safe by design, which we call Scientist AI. This system is designed to explain the world from observations, as opposed to taking actions in it to imitate or please humans. It comprises a world model that generates theories to explain data and a question-answering inference machine. Both components operate with an explicit notion of uncertainty to mitigate the risks of overconfident predictions. In light of these considerations, a Scientist AI could be used to assist human researchers in accelerating scientific progress, including in AI safety. In particular, our system can be employed as a guardrail against AI agents that might be created despite the risks involved. Ultimately, focusing on non-agentic AI may enable the benefits of AI innovation while avoiding the risks associated with the current trajectory. We hope these arguments will motivate researchers, developers, and policymakers to favor this safer path.