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Alan Chan

Alumni

Publications

IDs for AI Systems
Noam Kolt
Peter Wills
Usman Anwar
Christian Schroeder de Witt
Lewis Hammond
David M. Krueger
Lennart Heim
Markus Anderljung
Black-Box Access is Insufficient for Rigorous Al Audits
Stephen Casper
Carson Ezell
Charlotte Siegmann
Noam Kolt
Benjamin Bucknall
Andreas Haupt
Kevin Wei
Jérémy Scheurer
Marius Hobbhahn
Lee Sharkey
Satyapriya Krishna
Marvin Von Hagen
Silas Alberti
Qinyi Sun
Michael Gerovitch
David Bau
Max Tegmark
David Krueger … (see 1 more)
Dylan Hadfield-Menell
External audits of AI systems are increasingly recognized as a key mechanism for AI governance. The effectiveness of an audit, however, depe… (see more)nds on the degree of access granted to auditors. Recent audits of state-of-the-art AI systems have primarily relied on black-box access, in which auditors can only query the system and observe its outputs. However, white-box access to the system's inner workings (e.g., weights, activations, gradients) allows an auditor to perform stronger attacks, more thoroughly interpret models, and conduct fine-tuning. Meanwhile, outside-the-box access to training and deployment information (e.g., methodology, code, documentation, data, deployment details, findings from internal evaluations) allows auditors to scrutinize the development process and design more targeted evaluations. In this paper, we examine the limitations of black-box audits and the advantages of white- and outside-the-box audits. We also discuss technical, physical, and legal safeguards for performing these audits with minimal security risks. Given that different forms of access can lead to very different levels of evaluation, we conclude that (1) transparency regarding the access and methods used by auditors is necessary to properly interpret audit results, and (2) white- and outside-the-box access allow for substantially more scrutiny than black-box access alone.
Visibility into AI Agents
Carson Ezell
Max Kaufmann
Kevin Wei
Lewis Hammond
Herbie Bradley
Emma Bluemke
David Krueger
Noam Kolt
Lennart Heim
Markus Anderljung
Increased delegation of commercial, scientific, governmental, and personal activities to AI agents -- systems capable of pursuing complex go… (see more)als with limited supervision -- may exacerbate existing societal risks and introduce new risks. Understanding and mitigating these risks involves critically evaluating existing governance structures, revising and adapting these structures where needed, and ensuring accountability of key stakeholders. Information about where, why, how, and by whom certain AI agents are used, which we refer to as visibility, is critical to these objectives. In this paper, we assess three categories of measures to increase visibility into AI agents: agent identifiers, real-time monitoring, and activity logging. For each, we outline potential implementations that vary in intrusiveness and informativeness. We analyze how the measures apply across a spectrum of centralized through decentralized deployment contexts, accounting for various actors in the supply chain including hardware and software service providers. Finally, we discuss the implications of our measures for privacy and concentration of power. Further work into understanding the measures and mitigating their negative impacts can help to build a foundation for the governance of AI agents.
Characterizing Manipulation from Al Systems
Micah Carroll
Henry Ashton
David Krueger
Manipulation is a common concern in many domains, such as social media, advertising, and chatbots. As AI systems mediate more of our interac… (see more)tions with the world, it is important to understand the degree to which AI systems might manipulate humans without the intent of the system designers. Our work clarifies challenges in defining and measuring manipulation in the context of AI systems. Firstly, we build upon prior literature on manipulation from other fields and characterize the space of possible notions of manipulation, which we find to depend upon the concepts of incentives, intent, harm, and covertness. We review proposals on how to operationalize each factor. Second, we propose a definition of manipulation based on our characterization: a system is manipulative if it acts as if it were pursuing an incentive to change a human (or another agent) intentionally and covertly. Third, we discuss the connections between manipulation and related concepts, such as deception and coercion. Finally, we contextualize our operationalization of manipulation in some applications. Our overall assessment is that while some progress has been made in defining and measuring manipulation from AI systems, many gaps remain. In the absence of a consensus definition and reliable tools for measurement, we cannot rule out the possibility that AI systems learn to manipulate humans without the intent of the system designers. We argue that such manipulation poses a significant threat to human autonomy, suggesting that precautionary actions to mitigate it are warranted.
Hazards from Increasingly Accessible Fine-Tuning of Downloadable Foundation Models
Benjamin Bucknall
Herbie Bradley
David M. Krueger
Harms from Increasingly Agentic Algorithmic Systems
Alva Markelius
Chris Pang
Dmitrii Krasheninnikov
Lauro Langosco
Zhonghao He
Yawen Duan
Micah Carroll
Alex Mayhew
Katherine Collins
John Burden
Wanru Zhao
Konstantinos Voudouris
Umang Bhatt
Adrian Weller … (see 2 more)
David Krueger
Research in Fairness, Accountability, Transparency, and Ethics (FATE) has established many sources and forms of algorithmic harm, in domains… (see more) as diverse as health care, finance, policing, and recommendations. Much work remains to be done to mitigate the serious harms of these systems, particularly those disproportionately affecting marginalized communities. Despite these ongoing harms, new systems are being developed and deployed which threaten the perpetuation of the same harms and the creation of novel ones. In response, the FATE community has emphasized the importance of anticipating harms. Our work focuses on the anticipation of harms from increasingly agentic systems. Rather than providing a definition of agency as a binary property, we identify 4 key characteristics which, particularly in combination, tend to increase the agency of a given algorithmic system: underspecification, directness of impact, goal-directedness, and long-term planning. We also discuss important harms which arise from increasing agency -- notably, these include systemic and/or long-range impacts, often on marginalized stakeholders. We emphasize that recognizing agency of algorithmic systems does not absolve or shift the human responsibility for algorithmic harms. Rather, we use the term agency to highlight the increasingly evident fact that ML systems are not fully under human control. Our work explores increasingly agentic algorithmic systems in three parts. First, we explain the notion of an increase in agency for algorithmic systems in the context of diverse perspectives on agency across disciplines. Second, we argue for the need to anticipate harms from increasingly agentic systems. Third, we discuss important harms from increasingly agentic systems and ways forward for addressing them. We conclude by reflecting on implications of our work for anticipating algorithmic harms from emerging systems.