Dans un nouvel article, David Rolnick et ses collègues affirment que la recherche en IA axée sur les problèmes contribuera à accroître l'efficacité à long terme de l'IA.
Ce programme est conçu pour fournir aux professionnel·le·s travaillant dans le domaine de la politique une compréhension fondamentale de la technologie de l'IA.
Nous utilisons des témoins pour analyser le trafic et l’utilisation de notre site web, afin de personnaliser votre expérience. Vous pouvez désactiver ces technologies à tout moment, mais cela peut restreindre certaines fonctionnalités du site. Consultez notre Politique de protection de la vie privée pour en savoir plus.
Paramètre des cookies
Vous pouvez activer et désactiver les types de cookies que vous souhaitez accepter. Cependant certains choix que vous ferez pourraient affecter les services proposés sur nos sites (ex : suggestions, annonces personnalisées, etc.).
Cookies essentiels
Ces cookies sont nécessaires au fonctionnement du site et ne peuvent être désactivés. (Toujours actif)
Cookies analyse
Acceptez-vous l'utilisation de cookies pour mesurer l'audience de nos sites ?
Multimedia Player
Acceptez-vous l'utilisation de cookies pour afficher et vous permettre de regarder les contenus vidéo hébergés par nos partenaires (YouTube, etc.) ?
Bayesian Persuasion is proposed as a tool for social media platforms to combat the spread of misinformation. Since platforms can use machine… (voir plus) learning to predict the popularity and misinformation features of to-be-shared posts, and users are largely motivated to share popular content, platforms can strategically signal this informational advantage to change user beliefs and persuade them not to share misinformation. We characterize the optimal signaling scheme with imperfect predictions as a linear program and give sufficient and necessary conditions on the classifier to ensure optimal platform utility is non-decreasing and continuous. Next, this interaction is considered under a performative model, wherein platform intervention affects the user's future behaviour. The convergence and stability of optimal signaling under this performative process are fully characterized. Lastly, we experimentally validate that our approach significantly reduces misinformation in both the single round and performative setting.
Bayesian Persuasion is proposed as a tool for social media platforms to combat the spread of misinformation. Since platforms can use machine… (voir plus) learning to predict the popularity and misinformation features of to-be-shared posts, and users are largely motivated to share popular content, platforms can strategically signal this informational advantage to change user beliefs and persuade them not to share misinformation. We characterize the optimal signaling scheme with imperfect predictions as a linear program and give sufficient and necessary conditions on the classifier to ensure optimal platform utility is non-decreasing and continuous. Next, this interaction is considered under a performative model, wherein platform intervention affects the user's future behaviour. The convergence and stability of optimal signaling under this performative process are fully characterized. Lastly, we experimentally validate that our approach significantly reduces misinformation in both the single round and performative setting and discuss the broader scope of using information design to combat misinformation.